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Abstract: We examine the potential impact of T-TIP through trade cost reductions, applying a 
mix of econometric and computational methods to develop estimates of the benefits (and 
costs) for the EU, US, and third countries.  Econometric results point to an approximate 80 
percent growth in bilateral trade with an ambitious trade agreement. However, at the same 
time, CGE estimates highlight distributional impacts across countries and factors not evident 
from econometrics alone. Translated through our CGE framework, while bilateral trade 
increases roughly 80 percent, there is a fall of about 2.5 percent in trade with the rest of the 
world in our central case. The estimated gains in annual consumption range between 1 and 
2.25 percent for the US and EU respectively. A purely discriminatory agreement would harm 
most countries outside the agreement, while the direction of third-county effects hinges 
critically on whether NTB reductions end up being discriminatory or not. Within the US and 
EU, while labor gains across skill categories, the impact on farmers is mixed.    
Keywords: T-TIP, regional trade agreement, NTBs, regulatory convergence, gravity model, 
CGE model 






Trade policy research has long treated large-scale liberalization exercises as a focus of 
interest.1  Whether multilateral negotiations or preferential trade agreements (PTAs), the 
main instrument involved was the tariff.  Not only were tariff schedules relatively easy to 
negotiate, they were relatively easy to analyze quantitatively (the former fact at least in part a 
function of the latter).  The success of the GATT/WTO process in cutting tariffs produced 
negotiating rounds that lasted longer and were considerably more fraught as remaining tariffs 
were more deeply embedded in domestic political structures and, at least for the industrial 
countries that had been most successful in reducing tariffs, the focus turned increasingly to 
non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs; some of which were still border barriers, but many of 
which are rooted in domestic regulatory commitments).  With the apparent failure of the 
Doha round, there has been an increasing emphasis on negotiating PTAs involving extensive 
commitments on non-tariff, as well as tariff, barriers.  Thus, PTAs differ not only in the so-
called preference margins they grant (in terms of the number of products covered and the 
depth of cuts in applied rates) but also the commitments on issues beyond tariffs. The current 
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the rapid increase in the number of PTAs (Figure 1a), and the 
rapid increase in the depth of such agreements (Figure 1b).2 
The difficulty with providing a systematic analysis of such deep agreements (as well as with 
negotiating them) is that most of the objects of negotiation cannot be directly represented as a 
policy-induced, tariff-like, ad-valorem price-wedge.  Since tariffs simply generate a wedge 
between domestic prices and the world price that can be analyzed in a relatively 
straightforward manner with well-established methods, NTBs work differently through, e.g., 
labeling rules, differential application of competition policy, or uncertainties associated with 
implementation of administered protection.  In this paper, we present a method for estimating 
magnitudes of actionable trade costs in terms of their ad valorem equivalents (AVEs), 
covering both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.  That is, we provide estimates of ad 
valorem tariffs that would have the same effects as non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  With those  
in hand, we are able to evaluate the effects of a PTA involving a substantial reduction of such 
costs using standard computational general equilibrium methods.   
This approach rests on three pillars. First, in addition to measures of tariffs, we estimate 
levels of non-tariff, policy and natural trade costs by way of a so-called gravity model of 
bilateral international trade. This yields the impact of the depth of existing PTAs on trade 
volumes. Second, we take these estimates to gauge potential changes in ad-valorem trade 
costs associated with the formation of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP). Third, we employ estimated trade cost changes in a multi-sector, multi-country 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to quantify the associated responses of key 
economic indicators across T-TIP participants and outsider (third) countries. Our analysis 
leads us to conclude that responses to the formation of T-TIP by the insider countries will be 
                                                
1 By the early 1980s, computational general equilibrium methods had developed to the point where they could 
be usefully applied to the prospective evaluation of the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations (e.g. Baldwin et al., 
1980; Brown and Whalley, 1980; Deardorff and Stern, 1981; Dixon et al., 1984).  Since then, virtually every 
contemplated trade policy change of any magnitude has seen evaluation using computational general 
equilibrium methods, from NAFTA to the Uruguay Round to the  current discussion of T-TIP. 
2 These figures are both from Dür et al. (2014): our 1a is Figure 1 of that article, our 1b is figure 5.  We will be 




modest but not insignificant: about 0.9% in real consumption for the US and about 2.1% for 
the EU as a whole with goods liberalization. Services liberalization adds slightly, but 
likelihood of services liberalization is weak, based on past agreements.  Effects on 
nonmembers tend to be negative and in the same ballpark, with the direction of third-county 
effects hinging critically on whether NTB reductions end up being discriminatory or not. 
In the next section we briefly describe T-TIP.  Section 3 presents our approach towards 
estimating trade costs and gauging the scope for reduction in those costs.  Section 4 presents 
an analysis of the welfare effects of T-TIP that would be associated with the aforementioned 
trade cost reductions in the proposed computational model.  By way of a conclusion, section 
5 provides a discussion of the political economy of deep PTAs. 
 
2. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
 
While a North Atlantic free trade area has been suggested for some time (see, e.g. Baldwin 
and Francois, 1997), the combination of minimal progress on the Doha round with the major 
recession and collapse of international trade associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
has increased interest in a major trade agreement between the EU and the US.  According to 
the online edition of Der Spiegel, well before the emergence of the financial crisis, 
Chancellor Merkel explicitly suggested a US-EU agreement as a backup in case the Doha 
round fails (Spiegel, 2006).  This was consistent with both EU and US policy of seeking 
bilateral PTAs, usually with extensive non-tariff commitments.  Thus, faced with continuing 
lack of progress in the Doha round, and ongoing recession in the US, President Obama 
announced that the US and EU would commence talks on a “comprehensive Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership” in his 2013 State of the Union Address.  The talks have 
proceeded through 7 rounds, alternating between Brussels and Washington, beginning in July 
2013 with the most recent round at the end of September 2014. 
The attraction of such an agreement seems obvious, in part, simply because of the 
magnitudes involved.  From Table 2-1, in 2011, together the two T-TIP partners accounted 
for 46 percent of global GDP and almost 60 percent of world trade.  Yet most of this trade is 
not actually trans-Atlantic trade.  Rather, despite their collective shares of world production 
and trade, trade flows between the two blocks are relatively low compared to their trade with 
other regions.  This is again illustrated in the data in Table 2 1, but perhaps better visualized 
with Figure 2-1.  Focusing first on directions of trade, the US has far more trade with Asia 
than it does with Europe.  Asia counts for almost 60 percent of US exports and imports.  
Similarly, the region accounts for roughly 39 percent of EU exports and imports.  Other 
upper and middle-income countries (Canada and Mexico primarily for the US, and EFTA and 
the Euro-Med economies for the EU) account for most of the remaining trade. 
To appreciate the context of T-TIP, both for the EU and US, but also for third countries, it is 
also useful to focus on trade intensity, reported in Figure 2-1 as trade scaled by partner GDP.  
For example, EU and US trade with the world is valued at roughly 13 percent of global GDP.  
This means that for each $100 billion in global income, we see $13.3 billion in trade 
involving the EU and/or the US.  In the case of Asia, for every $100 billion in GDP, there is 




Asian trade with the EU and US combined is therefore worth 17.6 percent of Asian GDP.3   
Stark asymmetries are evident, especially with low-income countries.  For the latter, while 
trade with the US and EU is worth 18.3 percent of their GDP, it is worth roughly 0.2 percent 
of EU and US GDP.  
Viewed in this context, though the EU and the US account for high shares of GDP and trade, 
in a sense the flows between them seem relatively low.  For example, while in Asia each 
$100 billion in exports is associated with $17.6 billion in trade with the EU and/or the US, a 
similar figure for the EU and US themselves tells us that for each $100 billion in transatlantic 
GDP, we see only $2.7 billion in trade in goods and services.  In other words, scaled by GDP, 
the EU and US both have much more intense trade relationships with other countries and 
regions than they do with each other.  Much of this is may be explained by economic 
structure.  Both economies are mature, with high GDP shares derived from services: 75 
percent of the EU value added is in services; 82.3 percent of US value added is in services.  
As services are less traded, this helps explain the lower bilateral flows.  Such factors should 
be controlled for when we turn to gravity modeling, as otherwise we may mislead ourselves 
into thinking low trade intensity means high trade barriers. Yet even controlling for such 
factors, at this stage we should already note the sense reflected in the negotiating mandate 
that transatlantic trade underperforms.  The logic is that with shifts in technology and 
organization of production toward more global and regional value chains that cross 
international borders, behind the border issues whose trade cost impacts were once second or 
third order are increasingly important.  Without necessarily changing policy, what were once 
domestic regulatory issues have emerged as potential sources of NTB-related trade costs in a 
world of international production and associated returns to scale.  To some extent, the US has 
dealt with these changes in NAFTA with respect to its North American partners (especially 
for motor vehicles).  The same holds for Europe in the context of the EU single market.  The 
T-TIP is approached with the combined NAFTA and EU single market experience helping to 
frame the current negotiations on regulatory divergence and mutual recognition of standards. 
This raises an interesting question: is the relatively modest trade between the US and the EU, 
i.e. relative to their trade with the rest of the world, a function of economic fundamentals or 
policy-induced distortions?  Even in the case of tariffs, it would appear that there are still 
non-trivial gains to be had from liberalization (see Figure 2-2).  However, the real gains are 
expected to be in the reduction of non-tariff barriers.  Among the areas both parties agree are 
negotiating priorities are: public procurement; rules of origin; administration of administered 
protection (e.g. antidumping and countervailing duty); and trade in services.4 In addition to 
these areas, there is considerable interest in regulatory harmonization in technical barriers to 
trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions, intellectual property (including 
geographical indications), and financial regulation.5 As with any negotiation, it will be easier 
to reach agreement on some of these issues than others.  A recent survey of stakeholders by 
the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation (Barker and Workman, 2013) 
summarized their results on prospects for these different objectives that we reproduce as 
Figure 2-3.  Since our goal is to develop estimates of the gains to be had from such a 
                                                
3 We are fully aware that scaling trade by GDP is not the same thing as quantifying the impact on GDP.  It does 
however provide a useful metric for comparison. 
4 Succinct summaries of negotiating objective can be found: for the US at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-T-TIP-a-Detailed-View; and for the EU at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152699.pdf.  
5 This reflects growing belief, and some evidence, that harmonization may reduce trade costs substantially. See 




liberalization, we will need estimates of the trade costs induced by non-tariff barriers in a 
form that will permit analysis similar to that of tariff costs.  That is, we seek estimates of 
what is broadly achievable and then what is more plausibly actionable.  We describe our 
approach in the next section. 
 
3. Quantifying the scope for trade cost reductions in T-TIP 
 
We turn next to quantifying possible trade cost reductions under T-TIP.  For tariffs this is 
relatively straightforward.  For NTBs, on the other hand, it is less so.  Therefore, we start 
with the easier task of describing tariffs, then move on to estimates of NTB reductions for 
goods in past PTAs, and, in particular, to estimates specific to the EU-US context.  We save 
the most speculative for last – quantifying NTB reductions for services. 
3.1$Tariffs$
For a quantification of tariff changes associated with T-TIP, we have to assess (weighted) 
levels of tariff barriers for each goods sector in a first step. The maximum tariff margin that 
could be granted through T-TIP reciprocally between the EU and the US is the weighted 
sector-level applied tariff for non-PTA members charged on imports by the EU and the US.6 
We employ this margin in the quantitative analysis as an estimate of the tariff preferences 
extended to members of T-TIP. 
Though both US and EU average (MFN and applied) tariffs are similar, there is heterogeneity 
when we break down tariff protection by sector.  From Figure 2-2, the most striking cases are 
motor vehicles and processed foods. The EU tariffs on these products are substantially higher 
than corresponding US tariffs, and indeed far higher than the trade-weighted average MFN 
tariff for goods overall. For motor vehicles,7 the EU applies an average tariff (7.9 per cent) 
that is over seven times higher than the one of the US. For processed food products, EU 
average tariffs (15.8 per cent) are more than three times higher than US average tariffs. 
Though primary agriculture appears relatively open, this is misleading.  Protection in this 
sector takes the form of a wide variety of NTBs, as will be seen in the next subsection. 
3.2$NTBs$on$goods$
We now turn to the trickier question of possible trade cost reductions linked to NTBs to 
goods transactions. As noted above, such cost savings may follow from such things as cross-
recognition of standards (a process where industry plays a central role) to acceptance of 
regulations (a process where regulators need to find common ground and essentially trust the 
approach taken by comparable agencies on the opposite side of the pond) or even to joint 
regulation and development of joint standards.  None of this can be considered as easy.  
While examples such as “run drug trials once and not twice” might seem obvious places to 
start, as we discuss in the conclusion, differences in the social/political approach to risk and 
consumer protection render even the obvious into something more complex and murky.8 
                                                
6 Notice that, in the absence of a current trade agreement between the EU and the US, the applied tariff rate is 
the same as the most-favored nation (MFN), or “bound”, rate for both the EU and the US. 
7 The motor vehicles sector includes also parts and components. 
8 We invite the reader to look through firm survey responses to regulation in the ECORYS (2009) annex 
material,  “Annex VI Business survey results”, which provides examples on an industry basis of sources of cost 




One place to look, in terms of estimating possible reductions in NTBs to goods transactions 
through T-TIP, is the magnitude of NTB reductions through PTAs in the past.  The EU itself, 
for example, has been engaged in a decades long exercise of reducing NTBs not unlike the 
goals stated for T-TIP.  We have also seen other PTAs, ranging from shallow tariff-only free 
trade areas (FTAs) to relatively deep and comprehensive agreements, such as the NAFTA.  
The NTB reductions associated with those earlier agreements may provide some guidance as 
to what one might expect from T-TIP, if it ends up looking like the deeper end of existing 
PTAs. 
In formal terms, NTB reductions to goods transactions associated with PTA membership can 
be estimated as follows. We may specify a so-called gravity model of bilateral trade, where 
we model bilateral trade flows as a function of (exporter- and importer-) country-specific 
fixed effects, a set of bilateral (geographical, cultural, historical, etc.) non-policy barriers to 
goods trade, the log tariff margin granted by a country pair (not necessarily only within 
PTAs), and PTA depth measures. Of these three policy measures, only the latter two pertain 
to economic policy, and the NTB effect of trade agreements corresponds to the joint impact 
of PTAs (or FTAs) conditional on tariffs and the depth of PTAs. Hence, NTB effects of 
PTAs must be associated with and can be estimated as effects beyond tariff reductions (see 
Egger and Larch, 2011). 
In order to estimate ad-valorem-equivalent (AVE) measures of PTA-induced NTB 
reductions, we estimate a gravity model of bilateral goods trade on a cross-section of data for 
the year 2011 for each sector, using the same level of aggregation as in the computational 
model, and comparable to earlier ECORYS (2009) aggregates.9 Bilateral sector-level trade 
flows are modeled as an exponential function of a log-linear index of five ingredients: 
exporter-specific factors (measuring the supply potential of exporting countries), importer-
specific factors (measuring the demand potential of importing countries), and the 
aforementioned three classes of bilateral factors (measuring “natural” or non-policy trade 
impediments in a broad sense, tariff impediments, and NTBs). We estimate exporter-specific 
and importer-specific factors as country fixed effects and parameterize bilateral factors in the 
log-linear index as a function of observable country-pair-specific variables. Estimating the 
model for each sector separately ensures that (i) neither trade (or demand or substitution or 
Armington) elasticities are forced to be the same across sectors (see Broda and Weinstein 
(2006) for evidence of a substantial variability of those across sectors; see Egger et al. (2012) 
for evidence of the variability of trade elasticities between goods and services), and (ii) that 
NTBs are permitted to vary across sectors (see Cadot and Malouche, 2012; ECORYS, 2009, 
for evidence of substantial variability of NTBs across sectors). The explanatory variables 
used in the gravity equations are summarized in Table 3-1.  
We parameterize non-policy barriers to goods trade in logs as a linear function of log bilateral 
shipping distances, common border, common language, and former colonial ties. We also 
include a measure of political distance based on measures from the political science literature 
(polity).10   
                                                
9 A mapping from these sectors for NACE is provided in the on-line annex.   
10 Shipping distances are based on actual shipping routes (Francois and Rojas-Romagosa, 2014), other  natural 
geo-historical trade cost measures are from the CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011), and polity comes 
from the Quality of Governance (QoG) expert survey dataset (Teorell et al., 2011). We use the pairwise 
similarity of polity, reflecting evidence that homophily is important in explaining direct (economic and) political 




For measuring tariff barriers, we include the bilateral tariff margin granted in free trade 
agreements. This margin is measured as the difference between the most-favored nation 
(MFN) rate, which is subsumed under the importer-specific fixed effect, and the rate used by 
a specific trade partner. This measure actually represents the negative of the preference 
margin.  
In order to estimate the extent of NTB reductions associated with PTAs conditional on 
natural (non-policy) and tariff barriers, we include two variables – a binary indicator variable 
for intra-EU relationships and an integer-valued variable for depth of non-EU PTAs based on 
data from Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014)—called DESTA.  This depth-of-trade agreement 
variable takes on integer values ranging between unity for shallow agreements and seven for 
deep agreements. Estimating a separate parameter on an EU membership indicator variable 
permits a special status of EU membership among all considered PTAs. It differentiates 
between the legal and institutional harmonization associated with EU membership, which 
clearly goes beyond the liberalization of policies in other PTAs.  
Table 3-2 summarizes the relevant trade-cost-function parameters of the gravity model 
regressions. In those regressions, we treat FTA (or, more generally, PTA) membership and 
depth of FTAs as endogenous (choice) variables in a control function approach. The 
approach is outlined in more detail in the Appendix and so are the first-stage (probit) 
regressions which are used to estimate the control-function terms (see Egger et al., 2011).11   
Across all regressions presented in the table, the explanatory power – measured by the 
correlation coefficient between the model and the data, dubbed the pseudo-R2 – is generally 
quite high (exceptions being primary/food sectors). The results suggest that overall, as well as 
at the sector-level, goods trade (in most sectors) rises (trade costs decline) with a larger 
preference margin granted in trade agreements with a greater depth of an agreement, and with 
EU membership. Note from Table 3-1 that we have used the DESTA database to identify 
PTA depth.  The parameter on the (negative) tariff margin reflects what is referred to as the 
elasticity of trade with respect to tariffs.12  With reference to the new trade literature on 
monopolistic competition and economies of scale, we would refer to sectors with a larger 
(smaller) negative value of that elasticity as more (less) competitive. Accordingly, we would 
say that the results suggest that the competitive pressure is particularly high in primary 
energy production, other machinery, and motor vehicles.  
A deep trade agreement directly benefits (recall that the presented parameters measure only 
direct or partial effects) almost all sectors more than a shallow agreement, except in motor 
vehicles and electrical machinery.  In the case of the EU and US, estimated effects under a 
deep FTA are limited to fewer sectors: primary agriculture; processed foods; beverages and 
tobacco; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; motor vehicles; and other machinery. For all goods, 
                                                
11 From a general perspective, such an approach relies on some instrumental variables which help splitting the 
variation in an endogenous variable – e.g., the integer-valued depth-of-agreement measure – into two 
components: one that contains exogenous variation only and one that contains also endogenous variation. In the 
present analysis, we assume joint normality of the endogenous variables and we base the control function on 
generalized Mills’ ratios that are obtained from an ordered probit model of depth-of-trade agreements. Since 
intra-EU relationships are associated with a depth measure of seven, and tariff margins granted in agreements 
are correlated with the depth of agreements, a flexible function of depth-integer-specific Mills’ ratios is capable 
of controlling for the endogeneity of all trade policy measured included in the analysis. 
12 This is often estimated at being between -3.5 and -7 for aggregate trade flows and varies largely across 
sectors.  See for example Broda and Weinstein (2006). We estimate the models in share terms (normalized by 
importer expenditures) and employ the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) estimator for logit estimation with 




EU membership, with all its provisions that are directly and indirectly related to goods trade, 
exhibits a direct semi-elasticity of 0.575, or 100×(e0.575-1) ≈ 78 percent. On a volume basis, 
the direct gains from EU integration are particularly large for: primary food; processed foods; 
beverages and tobacco; chemicals; metals; and motor vehicles. 
Similarly, the direct semi-elasticity associated with shifting from no agreement to a deep 
agreement, which is our experiment for T-TIP, is 7 × 0.087 = 0.609, or 100×(e0.609-1) ≈ 84 
percent. (In the CGE exercise that follows, bilateral trade volumes increase by 78 to 82 
percent for EU exports to the US and US exports to the EU.) Notice that the estimated 
volume effect for an exporter to the EU of switching from no agreement at all to a deep 
agreement with the EU is similar to the estimated EU volume effect.  
Based on the tariff and FTA coefficients in Table 3-2, we translate the estimated trade 
volume effects into trade cost estimates.  Table 3-3 summarizes the ad-valorem equivalents 
(AVEs) of NTBs in columns A and B.   To see what these AVEs are, let the generic ad-
valorem tariff parameter be a and the coefficient on any non-tariff measure be b. Moreover, 
denote the average value of any generic non-tariff trade cost by c. Then, the AVE≡100×(e-
bc/a-1) measures the necessary percentage point adjustment of tariffs that is equivalent to 
eliminating the respective NTB cost. In the table, the trade cost indicator c is either EU 
Membership or a deep trade agreement with the EU or the US.  In essence the term bc is the 
trade volume effect, and dividing it by the tariff coefficient gives the comparable tariff rate 
that would yield the same volume effect.  In Table 3-3 we have computed two tariff-
equivalents, one for cost-savings from EU membership (i.e., the deepest trade agreement in 
our sample) and one for estimated cost reductions following from the deepest observed 
FTAs.13 The results suggest that the tariff-equivalent effects of intra-EU (non-tariff) 
preferences are largest for primary agriculture and processed foods; beverages and tobacco; 
chemicals; metals; and motor vehicles.  For the most part, intra-EU cost savings are 
(sometimes much) higher than under deep FTAs. As evidenced by the difference between the 
two columns, if barriers are not removed in an FTA, then we will not observe cost reductions, 
even if there are actually substantial underlying barriers.  In other words, just because we do 
not see volume effects in FTAs does not mean that NTBs are not there.  Nor can we assume 
that deep FTAs achieve the full range of potential cost reductions. 
Columns C and D in Table 3-3 provide another basis for analysis.  These are from the 
ECORYS (2009) study of transatlantic NTBs. Those estimates are also gravity based, from a 
similar estimation framework to the one reported in Table 3-2.  The critical difference is that 
the estimates in columns C and D are based on firm survey based pairwise rankings of market 
access conditions across markets (scored 0-100).  On that basis, relative access conditions 
were found to vary systematically for intra-EU vs extra-EU trade (meaning EU trade with 
third countries).  Converting those volume effects into trade cost equivalents, and applying 
additional information from the firm responses (the share of total NTB related costs that 
could realistically be removed by a mix of cross recognition and regulatory convergence) 
yields the results summarized in columns C and D.  Essentially, columns A and B are 
estimates of what has been accomplished in existing trade agreements. Columns C and D, 
following a similar methodology, focus instead on possible cost savings in the trans-Atlantic 
context.  For most sectors where we have available estimates in the second set of columns, 
the estimates are generally quite similar, especially if we focus on the intra-EU estimates as a 
benchmark.  Interestingly, though tariffs on primary agriculture were shown above to be 
                                                




relatively low, from the estimates in Table 3-3 the impact of NTBs on this set of goods is 
actually quite dramatic.  In addition, there is clear evidence of substantial cost savings in the 
context of both deep PTAs and the EU itself. 
NTBs on services 
Finally, we now turn to services.  This is a difficult area both in PTAs and in the WTO, 
where services are covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services, aka the GATS. 
(see Francois and Hoekman, 2010 for a general discussion of measurement problems).  
Fortunately, new sets of data have been released based on relatively detailed analysis of 
regulatory regimes in services, combined with assessments of how GATS and PTA 
commitments in services compare to policies actually in place.  We will work in this section 
with estimates of trade restrictions in services from the World Bank (Borchert et al., 2014), 
AVEs for trade barriers in services based on the World Bank data (Jafari, 2014), and 
assessments of GATS bindings and how these compare to PTA services commitments from 
the WTO (Roy, 2011 database updated 2013). Hence, in contrast to the previous subsection, 
where we estimated AVEs of NTBs to goods transactions ourselves, we employ AVEs of 
NTBs to services transactions from other sources listed above. 
Table 3-4 provides summary information for services for the EU and the US.  The first two 
columns provide estimated AVEs of market access restrictions in services on the basis of the 
World Bank’s STRI database (Jafari, 2014) and are comparable to estimates from other 
sources.  They represent actual levels of market access.  These pertain to trade in services in a 
traditional sense.  The numbers are AVEs on cross-border trade in services.  Such trade may 
require establishments abroad. Indeed the World Bank’s STRI database includes both 
restrictions on setting up foreign establishments and direct restrictions on cross border trade 
(modes 1 & 3; see Francois and Hoekman 2010). Essentially, the trade cost estimates in the 
table pertain to how the combination of mode 1 & 3 restrictions map into cross border trade. 
Also working with the World Bank’s STRI data, van der Marel and Shepherd (2013) 
conclude that there is substantial heterogeneity in regulations and so in their impact on 
services trade. Columns C and D provide a different perspective.  These provide scores from 
0 to 100, where 0 means no binding commitments have been made and 100 means full 
commitments have been made to bind policies linked to market access for particular sectors. 
From columns C and D, many sectors are relatively unbound both in the GATS, but also in 
terms of the deepest commitments made by either the EU or the US within PTAs.  There are 
exceptions, such as the distribution sector, construction, and communications.  Yet from 
columns A and B these sectors are relatively open anyway.  A similar message is provided by  
Borchert et al. (2011), who note that in general GATS commitments provide little in terms of 
binding commitments relative to actual policy.  Where we see the highest protection in Table 
3-4, in professional and business services, both the EU and US are highly protective, and they 
are reticent to make actual commitments in these sectors.  Yet, from column E, business and 
professional services are the single most important set of services, in terms of trans-Atlantic 
trade.  As such, while we see little evidence of actual liberalization under the GATS or PTAs, 
there is great potential given the size of barriers (the AVEs in columns A and B) and the 
services trade shares (column E).  On the US side, other standouts are banking and insurance 
(high barriers, little evidence of actual binding commitments) and maritime services (same 
story).  
How do we interpret the data in Table 3-4?  Based on past experience, neither the US nor the 
EU has shown a willingness to make binding commitments to open service sectors where 




depart from past behavior.  However, this means we will be embarking on numerical 
speculation, even more so than usual, when projecting services NTB cost reductions in our 
numerical modeling.  
 
4. A Numerical Model of T-TIP 
 
Overview of the model 
We utilize a computational model that belongs to a class of models known as computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models.14  There is a single representative or composite household 
in each region. Household income is allocated to government, personal consumption, and 
savings. In each region the composite household owns endowments of the factors of 
production and receives income by selling the services of these factors to firms. It also 
receives income from tariff revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota licenses. 
Part of the income is distributed as subsidy payments to some sectors, primarily in 
agriculture.  
Taxes are included at several levels in the model. Production taxes are placed on intermediate 
or primary inputs, or on output. Tariffs are levied at the border. Additional internal taxes are 
placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at differential rates 
that discriminate against imports. Where relevant, taxes are also placed on exports, and on 
primary factor income. Finally, where relevant (as indicated by social accounting data) taxes 
are placed on final consumption, and can be applied differentially to consumption of 
domestic and imported goods.  
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors (capital, 
labor and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources to produce outputs 
in the most cost-efficient way that technology allows. In some sectors, perfect competition is 
assumed, with products from different regions modeled as imperfect substitutes based on 
CES preferences (known as the Armington assumption).  
Manufacturing and business services are modeled with monopolistic competition. 
Monopolistic competition involves scale economies that are internal to each firm, depending 
on its own production level. An important property of the monopolistic competition model is 
that increased specialization at intermediate stages of production yields returns due to 
specialization, where the sector as a whole becomes more productive the broader the range of 
specialized inputs. In models of this type, part of the impact of policy changes in final 
consumption follows from changes in available choices (the variety of goods they can choose 
from). Similarly firms are affected by changes in available choices (varieties) of intermediate 
inputs. Changes in available varieties also involve changes in available foreign varieties, in 
addition to domestic ones. As a result, changes in consumer and firm input choices will 
                                                
14 There are strong similarities to the recent class of structurally estimated general equilibrium models (see 
Arkolakis et al., 2012 for an overview).  However, unlike some of these models (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002; 
Helpman et al., 2008), we do not assume that all observed deviations in actual trade from predicted trade (not 
explained by pairwise distance or by size of markets) results from unobserved trade costs (for more discussion 
on these points, see De Melo and Tarr, 1992; Francois et al., 2013; Francois and Shiells, 1994; Hertel, 1997; 
Hertel, 2013). We might consider most structurally estimated and then simulated trade models as nothing else 
than overly simplistic CGE models relative to what had been done in multi-country large-open-economy CGE 




“spill-over” between countries as they trade with each other.15 Finally, the model also 
includes a medium-term closure, meaning that capital stocks are linked to underlying 
equilibrium levels of investment.16 
The model calibration is based on data that are collected in the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database. Tariffs and tariff revenues are explicit in that database and, therefore, can 
be directly incorporated into the model used here. However, NTBs affecting goods and 
services trade, as well as cost savings linked to trade facilitation, are not explicit in the 
database and we need to incorporate those as ad-valorem-equivalents (AVEs) as obtained 
from the estimates as outlined in Section 3.17 In formal terms, most NTBs affect the 
efficiency of production for sale in specific markets. Where NTBs instead involve higher 
prices because of rents, we model this as additional mark-ups (higher prices) accruing to 
firms.  A reduction of NTBs then involves a surrendering of the associated rents. From firm 
and regulator surveys (see ECORYS 2009) a good rule of thumb is a 50:50 split of the AVEs 
for NTBs into market-serving costs and rents. 
The closest to our study in terms of methodology and underlying data is CEPR (2013). The 
latter uses very similar underlying data and methodology in its estimates and reports real 
income changes in its Annex.  
 
Specifying the experiment 
With a computational model in hand, the next step is specifying the policy experiment.  We 
base these on values in Figure 3-1 and Tables 3-3 and 3-4. For goods, we assume full tariff 
elimination. In addition, we use the AVE estimates of reductions of NTBs to goods trade 
associated with deep FTAs.  As outlined above, the situation is trickier when it comes to 
services.   
In order to specify a scenario for NTBs on services transactions, we combine two thoughts. A 
pessimist might consider it plausible that an agreement will be signed that includes services 
but where, as in past agreements, nothing actually happens in terms of market access 
conditions for services.  This is a view consistent with the pattern of values reported in Table 
3-4.  An optimist might be more inclined to give negotiators the benefit of the doubt. There is 
a clearly stated policy objective of improving market access in services. (i.e. “This time will 
be different.”) Yet in some sectors (distribution in the US) we already have essentially free 
trade, and in others we are close (communications services).  We choose to be cautiously 
optimistic. Based on statements of negotiators, worries about the maneuvering of financial 
institutions to undercut regulation through T-TIP, and the deep commitments already made 
under Basel III, we do not expect real liberalization in finance (banking and insurance) under 
T-TIP even with an optimistic assessment. However, being cautious optimists, for other 
sectors we have opted to include 50% reduction of AVEs from Table 3-4 for the remaining 
sectors (excluding finance), reflecting the rough rule of thumb that half of these AVEs might 
be eliminated with a real, deep set of commitments on services (meaning half of these costs 
                                                
15 Critically, when we move from one to many sectors with general equilibrium constraints on overall resources, 
shifting resources out of some sectors and into others leads to impacts on variety/scale effects at sector level that 
we miss in a single-sector model, in the sense that when one sector gains another loses.  See Francois and 
Nelson (2002)  for further discussion on this point. 
16 In this sense the model follows the structure in Baldwin et al. (1997) and Francois et al. (2005). 
17 The original Francois (1999; Francois, 2001) approach to the inclusion of iceberg-type costs in GTAP has 




are actionable).  To reiterate a point made earlier, our AVEs for services reflect the combined 
impact of restrictions on all modes on cross-border trade, and we are not claiming to model 
variations in liberalization by mode.18  Rather, we model an effective liberalization across 
modes sufficient to reduce the overall AVE for cross-border trade by half.   
In what follows we will separate services from goods, so that the more cynical readers can 
also focus on a sub-experiment that excludes services liberalization. The trade cost shocks 
(the tariffs and tariff equivalents for NTBs to be eliminated) is summarized in Table 4-1.  
 
Simulated effects from T-TIP implementation 
Table 4-2 summarizes our estimates of national income changes, measured as changes in real 
household consumption (meaning nominal household incomes by region are deflated by 
changes in prices), under our core T-TIP scenario.  In the table, we provide a breakdown 
along the elements of the scenario (tariffs, goods NTBs, and services NTBs) and also across 
regions.  Each cell provides a point “estimate” of comparative static effects that is consistent 
with the parameter point estimates in Table 3-3 and with the average shocks in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-2 also reports “confidence intervals” around these point “estimates” which are 
associated with the 95-percent confidence intervals of the parameters in Table 3-3 for goods 
and, in the absence of parameter estimates, we take zero and thrice AVE as the boundaries of 
the range (centered around the mid-point AVE) for services. (Indeed also for goods, we set a 
lower bound of zero for goods NTB cost reductions as well). The two values in squared 
brackets and separated by a tilde below the average effects refer to the range of general-
equilibrium-consistent responses pertaining to the associated range of partial effects.  
For both the US and the EU, the primary action comes from goods liberalization rather than 
services.  This is seen by comparison of columns D and E.  Indeed, for goods, NTBs 
dominate by far the benefits of tariff reductions.  In our goods only scenario (column D), the 
EU gains 2.61 percent in terms of annual real consumption on average (with a range of 0.83 
to 3.56), and the US gains roughly 0.91 percent on average (with a range of 0.35 to 1.68 
percent).  Within the EU, we also break out the impact on the larger EU economies.  Here we 
see that these larger states gain somewhat less than the overall EU gains.  While Germany 
gains 1.27 on average, some of the larger Member States (Spain, France) gain far less than 
Germany or the UK.  These represent increases in annual levels of consumption where we 
have essentially assumed the agreement had already been in place in 2011.  Column F 
provides a different view.  Here we use a discount function V(F), where we assume a gradual 
phase in, so that 10% of the change is realized in year one, 20% in year 2, etc., and full 
realization of this change is realized by year 10. We further assume to start from an economy 
otherwise like that in 2011, we use a discount rate of 3.5%, and we focus on 20 years of 
changed real income changes.  On this basis, the projected agreement yields a stream of 
income gains worth a lump sum or one-time payment of 24.0 percent of GDP for the EU, and 
10.3 percent for the US.  Strikingly, the accumulated costs for third countries, especially for 
EFTA members, Turkey, and the Asia-Pacific partners of the US (the TPP grouping) is 
comparable, in terms of accumulated losses, to US gains.  What we see, therefore, from 
columns D, E, and F is that a classic, fully discriminatory approach to T-TIP could 
                                                
18 The trade negotiators (lawyers) that set up the General Agreement on Trade in Services at the WTO chose to 
define trade as including foreign affiliate sales and temporary migrant income as trade.  Being economists, we 




potentially be very costly for third countries.  The patterns across countries hinge on the trade 
and production structures and underlying NTBs.19 
There are expectations of possible trade cost reductions for third countries from T-TIP.  They 
are collectively referred to as “regulatory convergence spillovers” or “NTB reduction 
spillovers.”  Indeed, if the US and the EU launch a process of regulatory streamlining and 
mutual recognition, and if this process proves to be relatively non-discriminatory, there may 
be ancillary benefits to third countries.  This means, for example, that Turkey might find it 
somewhat easier to access the US market if the EU and US rules and standards move closer 
together and/or are streamlined due to T-TIP. In effect, it may become easier to access the 
combined EU-US market, in terms of regulatory barriers, than it was for the two distinct 
markets.  Apart from informal discussion with industry and negotiators, where firms do seem 
to believe such potential benefits are lurking in the shadows, we have little basis for knowing 
exactly how large such spillovers might be (or even if they will be realized).  Even so, in 
Table 4-3 we report estimated impacts of such spillovers, defined as improved market access 
for third countries exporting to the EU and US.  What we have done, starting from the results 
reported in Table 4-3 is to further assume that 20% of the NTB cost reductions realized by 
US firms accessing the EU, and EU firms accessing the US, also accrue to third countries (for 
example Japan) accessing those same EU and US markets. 
A comparison of column F in Table 4-2 with column I in Table 4-3 illustrates a relatively 
important point.  The form that mutual recognition of standards and regulatory cooperation 
might take under T-TIP is rather central to the whole affair.  With some NTB harmonization 
between the EU and US leading to an effective reduction in costs for third countries, benefits 
might, potentially, then be expected for third countries, especially for upper and middle-
income countries. This is one possible negotiation path that, if followed, also yields the 
highest gains for the US and EU.  However, it certainly is not the only path possible, and 
indeed a more protectionist approach might be more responsive to lobbying interests and 
hence more likely. Under such an alternative approach, if the solution for a negotiated 
reduction of differences in regulatory systems is to establish some sort of deliberately 
discriminatory country of origin based mutual recognition mechanism for conformity 
assessments under divergent national regulations, third country exporters would be worse off. 
The official narrative assumes that such spillover benefits will be realized.  The magnitudes 
involved suggest that regardless of assumptions, it is in the interest of third countries to be 
rather aggressive in ensuring that non-tariff aspects of T-TIP actually are not structured to be 
deliberately exclusive and discriminatory. 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 go beyond average (factor owner) effects per economy and considers effects 
on labor income by skill class (low, medium, and high) and other primary factors (land, other 
natural resources) relative to capital income. As with Table 4-2, we report average (or point 
estimate) effects as well as confidence bounds in this table. In general terms, the results in that 
table indicate that the effects vary both quantitatively and even qualitatively for relative labor 
demand across skill groups. For example, the table suggests similar gains for workers across skill 
categories in the United States, while in the EU there is relatively more gain for lower skilled 
workers. There is a striking difference in returns to land owners (farmers) between the US and 
EU. We estimate a strong gain for US land owners, but strong losses for EU land owners.  
Especially hard hit is farmer income from land in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany but 
                                                
19 The online annex material includes tables with mappings between bilateral trade patterns and the NTBs 
included in out experiment definitions in Table 4-1.  It also includes tables on the value added composition of 




not in Spain or France. Overall, workers in the EU are predicted to gain more than skilled 
workers in the United States from the conclusion of a T-TIP along the lines of the discriminatory 
scenario spelled out in Table 4-1 and 4-2.  In addition, as in welfare effects, the magnitude of 
estimated effects on specific factor incomes (classes of labor, land owners) hinges on the extent 
to which an agreement is close to purely de facto discriminatory. 
Table 4-6 provides a summary of trade volume effects under the basic, full discrimination 
scenario presented in Tables 4-2 and 4-4.  Bilaterally, trade volumes between the EU and US 
increase by between 78 percent (EU exports to the US) and 82 percent (US exports to the EU).  
This is more or less identical to our point estimates from the econometric results discussed in 
Section 3.  For other regions, strong negative effects (from trade diversion) are estimated for 
EFTA, Japan, the TPP countries, and Turkey.  Other Asia Pacific and low-income exporters 
actually benefit somewhat in exports to the transatlantic block and to the world as a whole. 
Modeling comparison to other work on T-TIP 
Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, and Yalcin (2014, henceforth FHLY) provide a broad overview of 
related work to the present matter. Since their paper is published in the same, we provide a 
more limited comparison here to our own estimates here. 
While our results (exclusive of spillovers) indicate a 2.27% increase for the EU and 0.97% 
for the US in real incomes, CEPR (2013) estimates in its multi-sector CGE study a lower 
impact with EU GDP increasing by 0.48% and US GDP by 0.39%. The lower estimated 
effects are due to different scenario assumptions. While we assume that liberalization would 
go all the way to its potential, CEPR (2013) assumes only a 50% reduction of what a full 
liberalization would imply. In addition to lower ambition (in essence a shallower agreement), 
the CEPR (2013) study only covers NTBs for a much narrower set of sectors than we 
examine here (excluding primary products, other machinery, and other manufacturing, which 
accounts for one third of bilateral trade). 
CEPII (2013) estimates the impact of a transatlantic trade liberalization using a different 
multi-sector CGE model from ours with quite different underlying NTB AVEs. CEPII (2013) 
uses lower NTB estimates for agriculture and underlying NTB estimates for manufacturing 
are higher in the EU than in the US unlike in ECORYS (2009) estimates which are also used 
in this study. CEPII (2013) estimates a 0.3% increase in GDP both for the EU and the US 
over the long-run in their basic scenario and 0.5% increase for both economies with 
harmonization spillovers.20  
While the multi-sector studies presented by both CEPII (2013), CEPR (2013), and the present 
paper come to a relatively similar set of conclusions about modest effects of T-TIP on the 
covered economies, FHLY arrive at significantly higher GDP increases in their single-
(goods-only-) sector model. Since the FHLY paper is published in the same volume and 
addresses a similar set of issues, there is merit in comparing methodology here with FHLY. 
Some key differences are as follows: (i) first, we present estimates of key parameters 
                                                
20 One study that has grained a great deal of traction in the policy debate is Capaldi (2014).  That study uses the 
UN Global Policy Model.  (See Cripps and Izurieta 2014 for documentation.)  That model is a structural macro 
model with a number of disequilibrium features. The model does not include tariffs, other trade costs.  
Logically, also it does not include the basis for gains from trade when such costs are reduced.  Rather, the study 
simply takes trade volume effects from studies like those discussed here, and imposes these onto a basic macro 
model.  Without a basis for gains (or losses) from actual trade liberalization, at best such an exercise simply 
identifies the usual second terms of trade effects implied by changes in the current account under various CGE 




determining trade costs for goods based on the underlying data, while FHLY instead use 
parameter estimates from other papers (e.g. Egger, Larch, Staub and Winkelmann, 2011 
henceforth ELSW) that were obtained from different model parameterizations and different 
data than in FHLY.  For services, we do rely on estimates from the literature, while FHLY do 
not look at services liberalization at all; (2) second, the countries that constitute a nascent T-
TIP are members of prior PTAs (respectively, the EU or the NAFTA) that are unusually deep 
relative to the “normal” or average PTA observed “in the wild.” This suggests the nature, 
scope, and direct effects of T-TIP will not be comparable with those of an average PTA, but 
to deep ones. While we pay attention to this point by distinguishing between attributable 
tariff and NTB consequences of T-TIP that are relevant for the countries to be involved rather 
than for the average country pair in TTIP, FHLY assume that the effects of previous PTAs on 
average can proxy for the scope of T-TIP; (iii) third, while we treat NTBs as involving a mix 
of cost raising and rent generating barriers, most of the literature (including FHLY) treats 
NTBs as pure costs21; (iv) fourth, here an economy’s overall production potential is variable. 
The model includes input-output linkages across sectors, linkages between investment and 
installed capital stock across sectors, and reallocation of different skill sets of labor across 
sectors. The study by FHLY assumes that input-output linkages are absent, so that an 
economy’s overall production potential is fixed; (v) in our multi-sector framework, we 
distinguish goods from services, while FHLY do not.22 
 
5. Broader political economy issues related to T-TIP 
 
The results reported above are based, in part, on some rough judgments about actionability.  
As explained in section 3, these judgments reflect our beliefs about the political constraints 
facing deep liberalization in certain specific non-tariff barriers based on our informal 
evaluation of the past experience with liberalization in specific sectors and on the results of 
the surveys reported in the ECORYS (2009) study.  As we have already noted several times, 
the legal and institutional structures that in the context of trade policy are reasonably seen as 
non-tariff barriers are adopted for a wide variety of reasons (only some of which have 
anything whatever to do with their effects on trade).  As such, for many NTBs, removing 
them is not possible because, for example, they require constitutional changes, unrealistic 
legislative changes, or unrealistic technical changes.  Removing NTBs may also be difficult 
                                                
21 According to firm and regulatory survey data (see ECORYS, 2009), this practice overstates the potential cost 
savings from overall NTB reductions (perhaps by roughly 40 percent to 50 percent). 
22 The FHLY assumption that all of an economy’s activity is associated with goods production can bias results, 
as has been shown by Egger, Larch and Staub (2012). There are three reasons for this. First, there is a gap 
between a country’s GDP and its total income generated from goods sales from and income from working in the 
goods sector. This gap is larger for more developed economies, where the services sector accounts for more than 
70% of an economy’s size. Egger, Larch, and Staub (2012) show that not calibrating economies properly to their 
true size and ignoring services leads to largely biased trade cost estimates as well as to largely biased 
comparative static effects. In the model quantification, this problem shows inter alia in exaggeratedly large 
domestic production of goods (since all of a country’s GDP that is not traded is by definition erroneously 
classified as domestic goods sales, then).  Second, earlier work has demonstrated that trade (or demand) 
elasticities (see, e.g. Broda and Weinstein, 2006) and levels of NTBs (Cadot and Malouche, 2012; ECORYS, 
2009; Egger et al., 2012) vary substantially across sectors. Moreover, earlier work shows that trade elasticity 
levels are a key statistic for gauging quantitative effects of trade liberalization (Arkolakis et al., 2012). Hence, 
the two key statistics that are needed to properly project welfare effects of trade liberalization – domestic sales 




politically, for example because there is a lack of sufficient economic benefit to support the 
effort; because the set of regulations is too broad; or because consumer preferences or 
language preclude a change. Indeed even where public perception is not congruent with 
scientific evidence, we need to keep in mind that it's the public that votes, not the evidence.  
By way of a conclusion, we offer some reflections on political economic issues of direct 
relevance to the outcome of the T-TIP negotiations.  We begin with traditional political 
economy issues related to the distributive politics of T-TIP, then we consider the role of 
unemployment/adjustment, and finally discuss some non-traditional issues. 
Consider first distributive politics.  There is now a sizable literature, in economics and 
political science, on the ways political struggles over the returns to trade (and the losses 
realized by particular households and sectors in both the short- and long-run) affect the 
outcomes of domestic trade politics and, more relevant for the purposes of this paper, the 
outcomes of trade negotiations (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1995a; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995b; Ornelas, 2005a).  The usual goal of political economy papers in general is 
to explain deviations from optimal policies, so it is not surprising that most of this work 
emphasizes how politics cause deviations from “Liberal trade” (Krishna, 1998; Levy, 1997; 
Ornelas, 2005b).23  Certainly in the case of T-TIP there is no shortage of special interests in 
both the US and Europe seeking to use the negotiations to either increase access to foreign 
markets or reduce access to domestic markets.  In this paper we identify sectors that may gain 
and lose from liberalization of trade between the US and the EU, and it should not surprise us 
to discover that those sectors are actively lobbying their governments on those issues.24   
At the same time, contemporary negotiations between the EU and the US take place in a 
context that offers interesting differences relative to expectations based on standard models.  
Most obviously, a substantial amount of trade between the US and the EU takes place in 
differentiated intermediate goods along the lines of Ethier (1982).  At least since the classic 
paper of Balassa (1966), intra-industry trade (IIT) has been seen as less disruptive than inter-
industry trade (Brülhart, 2002; Dixon and Menon, 1997; Menon and Dixon, 1997) and while 
this inference is not as well-grounded theoretically as we tend to think (Lovely and Nelson, 
2000; Lovely and Nelson, 2002), there appears to be empirical support for the claim.25  Thus, 
just as integration among the early members of what became the EU was eased by the 
relatively low adjustment costs to liberalization of trade, the sizable role of IIT in US-EU 
trade may similarly reduce adjustment cost-driven distributive politics.  Similarly, the 
opportunity to rationalize nationally organized production on an international basis in sectors 
like motor vehicles, steel, and chemicals should produce support for integration where 
opposition is predicted in standard models. Consistent with this observation, the European 
motor vehicle industry is strongly behind the T-TIP (they have been primary drivers of 
political support, so to speak) while they were adamantly opposed to the EU-Korea 
agreement and are opposed to an EU-Japan agreement as well.  While in the case of T-TIP, 
most of the same firms operate on both sides of the Atlantic and see opportunity for 
                                                
23 Though Ethier (Ethier, 1998; Ethier, 2001) and Ornelas (Ornelas, 2005a; Ornelas, 2008) are exceptions here. 
24 For example, US cultural industries seek strong intellectual property protections and increased access to 
European markets, while European producers in these sectors seek exemptions to protect national culture.  An 
interesting case we note below is the US financial sector, which seeks regulatory harmonization not only to 
increase its presence in Europe but, perhaps more importantly, to secure reduced domestic regulation. 
25 Though, consistent with Lovely and Nelson (2000; Lovely and Nelson, 2002), Trefler (2004) finds that 
rationalization effects dominate in the long-run, but that short-term adjustment induced by rationalization 




rationalization, while in the case of EU-Korea or EU-Japan agreements the situation is closer 
to the classic one of opposing firms.26  
While the prominent role of intra-industry trade may lead us to expect lower adjustment costs 
and, thus, less dramatic political resistance to liberalized trade between the US and the EU 
than, say, between the US and China, short-run costs may still be substantial.  That is, 
analysis of the sort presented in this paper is comparative static in nature--we compare two 
long-run equilibria, not the transition between those equilibria.27  Trade economists are well 
aware that, in standard competitive models, the main source of long-run gain from trade is 
specialization and that (loosely speaking) the only way to secure large gains from trade is for 
policy to induce large adjustments in production structure (Ethier, 2009).  This of course 
implies that, in standard competitive models, policies changes associated with large gains 
from trade will also be associated with potentially large transitional costs (mostly in the form 
of unemployment, forgone wages, and mobility costs—including such things as loss of asset 
value from housing).  While there is not a lot of research on this question, the best efforts 
suggest that the costs are non-trivial.  For example, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 
(Jacobson et al., 1993a; 1993b) estimate that an average displaced worker loses $80,000 in 
lifetime earnings and Kletzer (2001) estimates that the average displaced worker suffers a 
13% pay cut as a result of trade displacement.28  We have already noted that research on 
intra-industry trade suggests that these costs may be mitigated when similar countries (i.e. the 
US and the EU) liberalize due to the major role of, presumptively less disruptive, intra-
industry trade.  Unfortunately, more recent theoretical and empirical work on trade with 
heterogeneous firms qualifies this last presumption, making this an issue of some concern 
when evaluating the effects of a major exercise in liberalization like the T-TIP. 
In the standard model (as well as in models of monopolistic competition), firms are presumed 
to be identical.  Recent empirical research suggests that this assumption is dramatically 
falsified (Bernard et al., 2007; Bernard et al., 2012).  Starting with Melitz (2003), a sizable 
body of theory and empirical research has developed based on the insight that firms are 
heterogeneous and studying how that heterogeneity interacts with international trade (Melitz 
and Redding, 2015; Redding, 2011).  In fact, this leads to an interesting form of complexity: 
on the one hand, heterogeneous firm models provide an additional source of gains from trade 
as more efficient firms displace less efficient firms, thus raising productivity (Melitz and 
Redding, 2013; Melitz and Trefler, 2012); on the other hand, the firm-level adjustment means 
that there is explicit attention to short-run adjustment on the firm margin that is associated 
with at least transitional unemployment as (within sector) inefficient firms close and efficient 
firms expand.  A number of recent papers have analysed adjustment to a shock which is quite 
relevant to the T-TIP case—the US-Canada free trade agreement (and its extension via 
NAFTA).  Starting especially with Trefler (2004) and applying firm-level data, these papers 
have examined the effect of integration with the US on Canada (e.g. Baggs, 2005; Baggs and 
Brander, 2006; Breinlich and Cuñat, 2010; LaRochelle-Côté, 2007; Lileeva, 2008; Lileeva 
                                                
26 See for example Ramsey (2012) and Clark (2014).  Lobbying is actually more complex, as Asian 
manufacturers also produce in the EU, and both Toyota and Hyundai are members of the European automakers 
association (ACEA). 
27 This comment also applies to analyses, like that by Felbermayr et al. (2013), which incorporates equilibrium 
unemployment.  While the effect of policy on the long-run equilibrium level of unemployment (like the effect 
on long-run equilibrium income distribution) is of considerable relevance to welfare analysis, its relevance to 
political economic analysis is considerably more doubtful. 
28 Davidson and Matusz (2004) is a convenient summary of results in this area, while Davidson and Matusz 




and Trefler, 2010).  The main result here is that, in the short run relatively inefficient firms 
exit, creating unemployment; but in the long run productivity rises and unemployed workers 
are absorbed.  Note well that this is precisely in the context of models of the Krugman sort 
(except with heterogeneous firms).  That is, even though rationalization may dominate 
intersectoral adjustment, the within sector, short-run effects will still be negative and, 
potentially, substantially negative.  From a political perspective, the short-run negative 
effects may be every bit as significant as the long-run efficiency effects.  Countries with well-
functioning welfare states should find it easier to liberalize in the face of such shocks than 
countries that lack such institutions. 
Turning to less standard political economic issues, distributive politics encourage us to treat 
opposition to liberalization as cynical special pleading.  However, especially when we turn 
from straightforwardly protectionist barriers to trade to harmonization of regulations that are 
deeply rooted in domestic understandings of identity, the good life, national safety, et cetera, 
this inference becomes increasingly strained, even as self-interested groups re-purpose such 
arguments to their own advantage.  Thus, while purely trade policy-related negotiations have 
become increasingly fraught as a result of domestic political opposition (witness the 
lengthening periods to resolution of multilateral trade agreements and the difficulty of 
American presidents in securing trade promotion authority), as soon as we consider issues 
like regulatory harmonization with some kind of non-trivial dispute resolution process, 
concerns about surrender of sovereignty are added to standard distributional conflicts.  It is 
tempting to treat all such resistance as thinly veiled rent seeking, but this is not really a useful 
way to understand the underlying politics.29  Consider three cases of relevance to T-TIP: 
regulation of cultural goods; food safety regulation; and financial regulation.  In all of these 
cases, there are fundamental differences between parties engaged in the T-TIP negotiations. 
Culture is inherently difficult to identify, but it goes to the heart of national identity.  US 
firms currently dominate the global cultural marketplace.  It is easy to see arguments for 
globalization as thinly veiled special pleading for US television and filmmakers, music and 
print publishers, et cetera.  It is just as easy to see arguments against globalization as thinly 
veiled special pleading for national (read “non US”) producers of the same goods.  However, 
“culture wars” in the US make clear just how strong are claims about the link between culture 
and identity (Huntington, 2005).  Especially in moments of economic uncertainty, “culture” 
and identity become strong instruments indeed in the political arena.  The politics of culture 
will always be difficult and unpredictable precisely because they are not anchored in material 
interests but elicit strong responses at the ballot box. 
Food safety regulation does not turn on quite such strongly intangible concerns, but still 
produces very different responses.  Food safety is, of course, a shared value between citizens 
and governments of both the EU and the US, and yet the approaches are fundamentally 
different.  The problem is that many technologies have uncertain future effects and, if the 
effects are at least plausibly sufficiently large, it is necessary to weigh the gains from 
admitting such goods into the food system against (possibly low probability) costs.  US law 
emphasizes immediate scientific process.  If chlorine washed chicken and genetically 
                                                
29 This is not to say that such rent seeking is not an essential part of the politics of trade policy.  It certainly is.  
The point is to recognize that when opponents of liberalization refer to sovereignty concerns, it is precisely 
because they tap into powerful notions of community norms that they are effective.  Treating them as simply 
bad faith is neither good politics, nor good analysis.  The inherent difficulty of incorporating such concerns in 
systematic analysis makes it all the more important that we recognize them where they may provide cause for us 




modified organisms cannot be shown to be dangerous with a high degree of certainty, there is 
a presumption that they should be permitted to enter the market.  The European approach 
emphasizes instead the precautionary principle—i.e. to the extent that we might reasonably 
suppose that they constitute risks to the food system, proponents of sales of chlorine washed 
chicken or GMOs must prove that they are safe with a high degree of certainty.  These are 
both reasonable, but debatable, principles for evaluating uncertain prospects (Gollier et al., 
2000; Sunstein, 2005).  The statement that “both countries agree on the goal of food safety” 
only goes so far in resolving a fundamental legal difference about how to evaluate policies in 
pursuit of that goal.  In addition, of course, parties facing redistributive effects from any 
harmonization can use legitimate differences between weighting of type-1 and type-2 error as 
tools in rent seeking. 
Finally, it is widely understood, especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global economic 
crisis that optimal regulation of the financial sector involves a trade-off of the gains from 
efficiency against the (potentially catastrophic, if low probability) losses from financial crisis.  
The appropriate policy is affected not only by aggregate attitudes toward risk, but also by 
uncertainty about both sources of and appropriate responses to instability.  Of particular 
relevance to T-TIP, the US has recently become more aggressive in response to financial risk.  
This leads to concerns about both what the appropriate policy is and active use of 
negotiations (especially by US financial institutions) to undermine domestic regulation 
(Johnson and Schott, 2013). 
While non-distributive issues of the sort we have just discussed may be essentially noise in 
characterizing the broad dimensions of, say, trade politics considered over some sizable 
period of time, but when we turn to the prospects for a particular policy choice (say, T-TIP) 
they should bulk much larger in our calculations. Unfortunately, the role of non-distributive 
issues in the framing of political-economic processes is severely understudied for such an 
important consideration. Building on Schattschneider’s (1960) classic characterization of 
democratic politics, William Riker (1986) developed a systematic analysis of the way 
political entrepreneurs can use valence issues to change political outcomes.30  In our context, 
the point is that outcomes from the political process around T-TIP are highly uncertain 
precisely because they are linked to public politics via emotionally powerful notions of 
identity, patriotism, et cetera.  This also serves as a warning about the interpretation of our 
welfare results.  That is, to the extent that culture, risk preference, and the like enter into our 
welfare (and there is certainly plenty of evidence that they do), our welfare results based 
essentially on national income may be well wide of the mark. 
Finally, it is probably worth noting that political economic context independent of trade 
policy can have a strong effect on final outcomes for T-TIP.  For example, for reasons 
completely unrelated to T-TIP, it seems exceptionally unlikely that the current administration 
will be granted trade promotion authority (“fast track”) by the current Congress, or the one 
that will replace it.  Recent extensions of trade promotion authority have generally involved 
cross-aisle cooperation of a sort that has disappeared in American politics.  If, as seems likely 
at this point, a Republican Congress faces a Democratic President, completion of T-TIP 
seems exceptionally unlikely. 
                                                




6. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the scope for negotiated changes in policy to lead to changes 
in transatlantic trade flows.  Building on econometric estimates of trade volume effects under 
T-TIP, we employ a CGE model to gauge the distribution of effects such an agreement might 
have across third countries and regions, and on primary factor incomes.  In this context, we 
also address the role that effective non-discriminatory reductions in trade costs may play in 
determining the pattern of outcomes. For third countries, the extent to which T-TIP is 
discriminatory has the potential to turn losses to gains.  Phrased differently, a purely 
discriminatory agreement clearly harms most countries outside the agreement. 
Early in the paper, we noted that North Atlantic trade is, in a sense, smaller than one might 
expect given the relative size of the two regions.  This raised the question of the role of policy 
barriers in explaining the fact.  Our econometric results suggest that the effect of potentially 
actionable barriers is non-trivial, pointing to an approximate 80 percent growth in bilateral 
trade with an ambitious trade agreement and a fall of about 2.5 percent with the rest of the 
world. However, at the same time, our CGE estimates highlight distributional impacts across 
countries and factors not evident from the econometrics alone. Translated through our CGE 
framework, in our central case, estimated gains in annual consumption range between 1 
percent and 2.25 percent for the US and EU respectively.31  Similar losses stand out for 
regions with strong trade linkages to the US and EU, including Turkey, EFTA, and the Asia-
Pacific economies that make up the T-TIP camp.  Within the US and EU, we see that while 
labor stands to gain (across skill categories), as do farmers (land owners) in the US, farmers 
in the EU stand to lose in our central scenario.   
From a policy perspective, then, because the economics show a moderate gain for the T-TIP 
partners, and only quite modest income distribution effects within T-TIP, the economics 
argue in favor of the policy.  However, as we argue in the previous section, as T-TIP 
contemplates potentially large changes in NTBs that are associated with more complex 
understandings of the implications of globalization.  As these have the potential to raise 
political risks for national leaders, the relatively modest gains suggest that we may see 




                                                
31 Of course, for some countries external to T-TIP, the changes in trade can be more substantial, e.g.: EFTA 




APPENDIX – gravity estimates of NTB cost reductions 
 
Empirical model outline 
In this appendix, we describe the basic procedure to control for endogeneity in selection into 
trade agreements. For the gravity estimates reported in Section 3 of the paper, we follow 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Egger et al. (2011) in employing a generalized-linear 
exponential-family model for estimating gravity models. One merit of such models is that, 
unlike ordinary least squares on the log-transformed model, they obtain consistent parameters 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity even if it is unknown whether the disturbance term is 
log-additive or level-additive. Furthermore, in line with Terza (1998, 2009), Greene (2002, 
2012), Terza et al. (2008), and Egger et al. (2011), we apply a control-function approach 
which, under a set of assumptions summarized below, is capable of absorbing the 
endogeneity problem and obtaining consistent parameter estimates, including the partial 
treatment effects of interest. 
Formally, we employ imports of country j from country i, Xij, as the dependent variable and 
specify it as an exponential function of a linear index of the form 
(A1) !!" = exp!(!!"!! !+!!!"!! + !! +!! + !(!!"))!!" 
where !!" is a PTA-depth measure (a scalar or a vector, depending on the specification),!!!" is 
a vector of observable (log) trade-cost measures (such as log distance, ….), (!!! ,!!!)′ is  a 
conformable parameter vector, {!! ,!!} catch-all measures of exporter- and importer-specific 
factors (estimated as parameters on i-specific and j-specific binary indicator variables, 
respectively.  Moreover,  
(A2) ! !!" = ℎ!"!! = ℎ!,!" ,… , ℎ!,!" !! , 
is a control function which is derived from the assumption of multivariate normality of the 
disturbances between the processes of selecting into depth δ=1,…,D and the stochastic term 
about !!". The application here represents an innovation on the existing literature, which 
generally focuses on binary selection in the case of trade agreements. 
The control function absorbs the potential endogeneity bias (i.e., the correlation of !!" with 
the disturbances). After introducing a binary indicator variable 1[!!" = !] which is one if the 
statement in square brackets is true and zero else, the elements ℎ!,!" for δ=1,…,D are defined 
as follows. 
(A3) ℎ!,!" = !(!!"!!,!)(!!![!!"!!]Ф(!!"!!,!))Ф(!!"!!,!)  
These are referred to as inverse Mills’ ratios (for !!" = !) in the literature (see, e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2010). They depend on the density, !(!!"!!,!), and the cumulative distribution 
function,!Ф(!!"!!,!), which, in a reduced form, depends on common observable 
characteristics, !!", and the depth-specific parameter vector !!,!.  
Notice that the assumption about multivariate normality is specific here, since selection into 
states δ is mutually exclusive (a country-pair can only apply a single level of depth δ of an 




pair ij where we order the data such that the terms for the D latent variables generating ℎ!,!" 
appear at the top and the stochastic term for !!" appears at the bottom. Apart from diagonal 
elements throughout, this matrix would then contain only non-zero elements in the bottom 
row and the right column. 
A somewhat different approach to the control function could be based on an ordered probit 
model about !!" = ! rather than individual probit models for each state δ. This approach 
would be somewhat more parsimonious in terms of the number of parameters to be estimated. 
In contrast to the aforementioned approach, this procedure would be based on δ-specific 
elements ℎ!,!" for δ=1,…,D which are defined as 
(A4) ℎ!,!" = ! !!!!!!!"!! !! !!!!!"!!Ф !!!!!"!! !Ф(!!!!!!!"!!) 
Notice that !!!! and !! are depth-specific, implicitly-determined threshold values which 
determine whether country-pair ij is in regime ! − 1 versus !. Hence, in contrast to ℎ!,!" 
estimated from individual probit models as in (A3) above and say DK parameters (where K is 
the number of parameters per probit equation), their counterparts in (A4) are estimated based 
on only D+K-1 parameters (where the K-1 are the parameters on !!,… , !!  , excluding !!,  
which is part of the D parameters in the base model). 
Basic assumptions 
The control-function approach outlined above rests on three basic assumptions. First, that the 
disturbances of the latent variables determining selection into a particular depth of trade 
agreements and the outcome equation (for !!") are multivariate normal, whereby the 
stochastic terms for each country-pair ij are drawn independently from but identically to 
those of other pairs. In the present case, they are bivariate normal for each and every level of 
depth, δ. Second, the universe of instruments collected in !!" (which includes all determinants 
of the outcome model except for the elements in ℎ!" and some additional identifying 
regressors, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005)) should be independent of the multivariate error 
terms (i.e., the instruments should be exogenous). Third and finally, the variances of the 
latent processes determining selection-into-agreement-depth are normalized to unity.  
The first stage is estimated by probit models on each level of depth of a PTA, {1,…,7} 
separately.  Hence, we estimate seven individual probits, allowing the parameters to vary 
between the equations. This strategy corresponds to a model where we estimate the 
probability 
(A5) Ф !!"!!,! + !!,!" ≥ 0 , 
where !!,!" !is a disturbance term about which bivariate normality is assumed with the 
disturbance term in the trade equation in logs, ln!(!!"), whereby Ф ∙  can be estimated by 
probit for each level of δ={1,…,7}. 
We specify !!" as to include log distance, land adjacency, two indicators of common 
language (ethnology-based and official), common colonizer, colonial relationship, the 
combined economic mass of countries i and j in terms of log GDP, a trade embeddedness 
index for the two countries i and j (measuring the overlap in the trade partner network) and a 




First-stage model results 
The results of the first-stage probit models are summarized in Table A.1 for all seven levels 
of PTA depths. The results suggest that having a PTA of any level of depth tends to become 
less likely the more (geographically or culturally) distant two economies are, the larger two 
economies are, and the more overlapping their trade partner network is. We use the three 
principal components of four political variables (one on the absolute difference in the 
functioning of government index published by Economic Freedom House; one on the 
absolute difference in the civil liberties index published by Economic Freedom House; one 
on the absolute difference in the political freedom index published by Economic Freedom 
House;  and one on the absolute difference in the corruption perceptions index published by 
Transparency International). 
The three associated principal components vary at the country-pair level, and we include 
them in both the first-stage (agreement-depth-selection) models and the second-stage 
(gravity) models. 
The probit model results for each agreement-depth level are reported in Table A.1, where we 
refer to the main political variable components by PCA1-PCA3. 
 
Some robustness checks for the empirical models 
The purpose of this Appendix is to show some alternative regression results regarding both 
the (first-stage) selection-into-deeper-agreements model and the (second-stage) gravity 
model.  
Regarding the first-stage agreement-depth selection model, we choose an alternative 
specification which includes a different set of political determinants from the one employed 
in the outset. We summarize alternative (second-stage) gravity-model results in Table A.2. 
This table includes six alternative gravity-model specifications that differ in terms of the 
political/institutional control variables used. The first four Columns A-D of this table include 
the four political/institutional variables one at a time (“polity index” is the absolute difference 
in the political freedom index published by Economic Freedom House;  “functioning of 
government index” is the absolute difference in the functioning of government index 
published by Economic Freedom House; “corruption index” is the absolute difference in the 
corruption perceptions index published by Transparency International; and “civil liberties 
index” is the absolute difference in the civil liberties index published by Economic Freedom 
House). Column E includes the aforementioned three principal components of the set of 
political/institutional variables. The associated results for the economic variables are very 
similar across all columns.  The last column excludes our endogeneity corrections, and 































































































































































































  US EU EU & US 
EU-US GDP       
billion dollars 14,991 17,645 32,636 
share of world GDP 21.3 25.1 46.3 
    Trade with world 
  
  
billion dollars 4,096 5,036 8,241 
share of world trade 29.4 36.2 59.3 
share of own GDP 27.3 28.5 25.3 
share of world GDP 5.8 7.2 13.0 
    Trade between EU & US 
   billion dollars 891 891 891 
share of own GDP 5.9 5.0 2.7 
share of partner GDP 5.0 5.9 2.7 
share of world trade 6.4 6.4 6.4 
share of own trade 21.7 17.7 10.8 
    Trade with Asia, Pacific 
   billion dollars 2,443 1,945 4,388 
share of own GDP 16.3 11.0 13.4 
share of partner GDP 9.9 7.7 17.6 
share of world trade 17.6 14.0 31.5 
share of own trade 59.6 38.6 53.2 
    Trade with other upper & 
middle income countries 
   billion dollars 740 2,142 2,882 
share of own GDP 4.9 12.1 8.8 
share of partner GDP 5.9 17.0 22.8 
share of world trade 5.3 15.4 20.7 
share of own trade 18.1 42.5 35.0 
    Trade with low income countries 
   billion dollars 22 58 80 
share of own GDP 0.1 0.3 0.2 
share of partner GDP 5.0 13.3 18.3 
share of world trade 0.2 0.4 0.6 
share of own trade 0.5 1.2 1.0 
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 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Ambitious but Achievable
Using the results of the survey, each issue has been 
plotted in terms of its relative degree of difficulty (on 
the Y-axis) as well as its importance to the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations (on the X-axis). As the 
graph demonstrates, issues’ ratings skew towards 
being considered both difficult and important 
factors in the negotiations. This finding is consistent 
with public statements by policymakers that caution 
there is little or no “low hanging fruit” to be found in 
the transatlantic discussions. Nevertheless, there is 
a degree of variability across the issues that gives 
some sense of where the relative sticking points will 
lie and what stakeholders’ expectations are at the 
outset of negotiations. 
Two issues were considered both relatively important 
and less difficult to agree upon. These are the 
elimination of tariffs or significant tariff reductions 
across most sectors, and an alignment of transatlantic 
intellectual property right (IPR) protections. These two 
issues would most likely appear in any agreement.
In the upper right quadrant, there are a number of 
issues that, based on their scores in both degree of 
difficulty and importance, represent a wide spectrum 
of regulatory and policy divergences that could 
prove possible to bridge in a broad agreement, but 
are perhaps less likely to be successfully included in 
a more modest agreement.
These issues that are considered most difficult 
and most important will require the most significant 
investment of political capital. As the plurality of the 
issues that the survey addressed are considered 
both the most important and most difficult points 
of contention, leaders will need to actively engage 
with one another to ensure that negotiators and 
regulators are working together to bridge these 
wide policy differences over topics including data 
privacy, standards for manufactured goods, and the 
transatlantic regulatory process generally. Each of 
these issues has the potential to derail negotiations 
if not handled effectively. 
A final set of issues were rated very difficult and 
relatively unimportant to the success of the overall 
agreement, and are therefore found in the upper left 
section of the graph. While labor and environmental 
standards have been major points of contention 
as the United States and EU have negotiated free 
trade agreements with other partners, there is 
widespread agreement that the two sides’ relatively 
high respective standards make these issues less 
important and less controversial in a transatlantic 
deal. Similarly, geographic indicators are an issue 
which respondents see as being relatively difficult yet 
relatively unimportant as they represent a small piece 
of the overall trade relationship. In order to quickly 
secure an initial agreement on TTIP, negotiators may 






Explanatory variables used in gravity modeling 
name description 
ln(1+tariff) log of the tariff (preference margin vis-à-vis MFN)  
  
ln(distance) log of shipping distance in km 
  
polity index index of political similarity (democratic institutions) 
  
common colony dummy for shared colonial history 
  
common language dummy for shared common ethnic language 
  
contiguous dummy for common border 
  
colony dummy for former colonial relationship 
  
EU dummy for intra-EU trade 
  







Table 3-2  Second Stage Gravity-Based Coefficient Estimates 
 
! All!Goods! Primary!Food! Energy! Processed!
Food!
ln(1+tariff)! 24.743! 27.159! 27.947! 23.795!













































































! (4.54)***! (6.18)***! (20.00)! (7.87)***!
! ! ! ! !
FTA!depth! 0.087! 0.15! 0.169! 0.158!
! (3.74)***! (3.25)***! (2.90)***! (4.87)***!
!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!N! 10,721! 10,341! 4,581! 10,539!
















ln(1+tariff)! 24.293! 21.907! 23.557! 23.895!
! (23.80)***! (20.27)! (21.80)*! (21.43)§!
! ! ! ! !
ln(distance)! 20.8! 21.172! 20.754! 20.857!
! (212.35)***! (214.90)***! (218.30)***! (219.54)***!
! ! ! ! !
polity!!index! 20.956! 0.09! 0.057! 0.302!
! (2.71)***! (0.25)! (0.31)! (1.43)§!
! ! ! ! !
common! 1.012! 0.314! 0.214! 0.215!
!!colony! (3.99)***! (1.29)! (1.35)! (1.21)!
! ! ! ! !
common! 0.538! 0.619! 0.398! 0.472!
!!!language!! (4.09)***! (3.71)***! (4.45)***! (5.19)***!
! ! ! ! !
common! 0.71! 0.642! 0.593! 0.684!
!!!border! (4.91)***! (3.59)***! (5.04)***! (6.69)***!
! ! ! ! !
former! 0.701! 0.496! 0.666! 0.537!
!!!colony!! (4.60)***! (2.47)**! (5.11)***! (4.95)***!
! ! ! ! !
European!Union! 1.498! 0.27! 0.889! 1.268!
! (5.16)***! (0.86)! (5.90)***! (8.25)***!
! ! ! ! !
FTA!depth! 0.215! 0.173! 0.11! 0.086!
! (4.57)***! (2.88)***! (3.64)***! (2.93)***!
!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!N! 9,928! 9,646! 10,447! 10,528!

















ln(1+tariff)! 27.29! 23.563! 28.209! 28.482!
! (23.21)***! (20.75)! (21.62)§! (25.67)***!
! ! ! ! !
ln(distance)! 20.596! 20.648! 20.665! 20.806!
! (28.58)***! (29.93)***! (215.41)***! (219.59)***!
! ! ! ! !
polity!!index! 20.042! 20.114! 0.127! 0.711!
! (20.18)! (20.63)! (0.72)! (3.88)***!
! ! ! ! !
common! 0.553! 0.467! 0.489! 0.274!
!!colony! (1.75)*! (2.22)**! (2.14)**! (1.89)*!
! ! ! ! !
common! 0.265! 0.641! 0.418! 0.529!
!!!language!! (2.12)**! (5.55)***! (4.85)***! (5.15)***!
! ! ! ! !
common! 0.807! 0.083! 0.48! 0.702!
!!!border! (5.77)***! (0.57)! (4.29)***! (6.33)***!
! ! ! ! !
former! 0.38! 0.782! 0.646! 0.739!
!!!colony!! (2.14)**! (4.19)***! (5.74)***! (4.94)***!
! ! ! ! !
European!Union! 1.299! 0.631! 0.133! 0.468!
! (5.89)***! (3.31)***! (0.74)! (2.81)***!
! ! ! ! !
FTA!depth! 0.184! 0.009! 0.071! 0.043!
! (3.82)***! ()0.25! (2.51)**! (1.42)§!
!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!N! 10,042! 10,233! 10,742! 10,786!






Table 3-3  AVE (ad valorem equivalent) estimates for NTB reductions 






















[6.3!~!21.61]! na na 70.6 















[19.02!~!50.49]! 25.4 25.4 5.4 















[12.51!~!48.11]! 10.2 11.4 19.1 




[5.25!~!29.43]! 5.3 9 4.1 
Motor vehicles 19.51![12.63!~!26.81]!
19.32!






















Table 3-4  AVEs (ad valorem equivalent) and market access in services 





trade$$$ EU$ US$ EU$ US$
SERVICES$ 12.79$ 12.94$ 55.3,$64.4$ 55.4,$55.4$ 29.4$
Construction$ na$ na$ 70.8,$83.3$ 83.3,$83.3$ 0.4$
Air$transport$$ 25.00$ 11.00$ 66.3,$72.5$ 5.0,$28.8$ 3.1$
Maritime$ 1.71$ 13.00$ 47.6,$63.1$ 0.0,$44$ 0.1$
Other$Transport$$ 29.73$ 0.00$ 57.1,$71.4$ 42.9,$64.3$ 3.1$
Distribution$ 1.40$ 0.00$ 71.9,$87.5$ 100,$100$ 1.0$
Communications$ 1.10$ 3.50$ 75.0,$78.1$ 78.3,$78.3$ 1.1$
Banking$$ 1.45$ 17.00$ 42.7,$42.7$ 29.2,$33.3$ 5.0$
Insurance$$ 6.55$ 17.00$ 57.5,$57.5$ 40.0,$50.0$ 2.7$
Professional$and$business$ 35.43$ 42.00$ 58.8,$62.5$ 57.5,$62.5$ 8.1$
Personal,$recreational$ na$ na$ 47.6,$50.9$ 91.5,$91.5$ 1.3$
Public$services$ na$ na$ 32.5,$36.7$ 19.2,$31.7$ 3.5$









!! EU!NTBs! US!NTBs! EU!tariffs! US!tariffs!
GOODS! 13.7! 13.7! 2.1! 1.3!
Primary!agriculture! 15.8! 15.8! 3.3! 2.2!
Primary!energy! 16.1! 16.1! 0.0! 0.1!
Processed!foods! 33.8! 33.8! 15.8! 5.0!
Beverages!and!tobacco! 42.0! 42.0! 5.9! 0.8!
Petrochemicals! 24.2! 24.2! 1.8! 1.6!
Chemicals,!Pharmaceuticals! 29.1! 29.1! 2.1! 1.3!
Metals,!fabricated!metals! 16.7! 16.7! 1.8! 1.2!
Motor!vehicles! 19.3! 19.3! 7.9! 1.1!
Electrical!machinery! 1.8! 1.8! 0.6! 0.3!
Other!machinery! 6.2! 6.2! 1.2! 0.7!
Other!manufactures! 3.6! 3.6! 1.7! 2.9!
SERVICES! 9.9! 6.7!!! !!
Construction! 4.6! 2.5!!! !!
Air!transport!! 12.5! 5.5!!! !!
Maritime! 0.9! 6.5!!! !!
Other!Transport!! 14.9! 0.0!!! !!
Distribution! 0.7! 0.0!!! !!
Communications! 0.6! 1.8!!! !!
Banking!! 0.0! 0.0!!! !!
Insurance!! 0.0! 0.0!!! !!
Professional!and!business! 17.7! 21.0!!! !!
Personal,!recreational! 4.4! 2.5!!! !!








TABLE 4-2   Income Effects with a Discriminatory, Preferential Agreement 
Real income (household utility from private consumption), percent change!
!! A! B! C! D=A+B! E=A+B+C! F=V(E)!

























































































































































































































Income Effects from Spillovers 
! ! !Real income (household utility from private consumption), percent change 




































































































































































































































































































































































Note that the model employs a Ramsey closure for the savings-investment market (see 




Table 4-5 Percent change in factor incomes relative to capital income,  























































































































































































Note that the model employs a Ramsey closure for the savings-investment market (see 


























Table A1. Probit selection equations modeling the probability of having a PTA with a particular level of depth 
! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7!
Trade!embeddedness!! 6.212**! 5.249***! 14.017***! 15.321***! 620.686***! 60.884! 10.220!
!!!index!for!2009! (2.281)! (4.504)! (3.663)! (4.629)! (63.126)! (60.151)! (1.161)!
Log!bilateral!distance! 60.295***! 60.808***! 60.925***! 60.335***! 60.617***! 60.539***! 61.347***!
! (63.585)! (617.966)! (612.110)! (65.480)! (66.417)! (66.429)! (610.826)!
Land!contiguity! 0.414*! 60.858***! 60.009! 60.174! 60.581**! 60.403! 60.674*!
! (1.804)! (65.828)! (60.037)! (60.756)! (62.014)! (61.345)! (61.841)!
Common!language!! 0.301! 0.169! 60.014! 60.345! 61.250***! 60.364! 0.701*!
!!!ethnology! (0.867)! (1.184)! (60.058)! (61.517)! (63.911)! (60.922)! (1.878)!
Common!official!! 0.974**! 0.037! 0.437*! 0.905***! 1.573***! 60.363! 60.703*!
!!!language! (2.444)! (0.243)! (1.709)! (3.926)! (4.493)! (60.972)! (61.818)!
Common!colonizer! 0.508**! 60.446***! 60.298! 0.416! 60.664*! ! 62.215*!
! (2.035)! (63.668)! (60.990)! (1.463)! (61.750)! ! (61.671)!
Colonial!relationship! 1.834***! 0.787***! 60.049! 60.123! 60.531! 0.087! 61.035***!
! (3.468)! (3.305)! (60.134)! (60.417)! (60.906)! (0.175)! (62.606)!




(60.196)! (3.611)! (3.548)! (61.423)! (0.341)! (60.656)! (2.246)!
PCA1! 60.395***! 0.005! 0.202***! 0.402***! 60.119*! 0.212**! 2.435!
! (64.608)! (0.164)! (2.868)! (9.362)! (61.872)! (2.163)! (1.170)!
PCA2! 60.516***! 0.163***! 60.083! 60.034! 60.233**! 60.221**! 60.615!
! (63.191)! (2.731)! (60.861)! (60.440)! (62.552)! (62.290)! (60.694)!
PCA3! 60.499***! 60.240***! 60.508**! 60.003! 0.040! 0.668***! 1.362!
! (62.893)! (62.851)! (62.209)! (60.019)! (0.182)! (2.794)! (0.854)!
N! 1,406! 7,734! 3,842! 3,530! 2,400! 3,089! 1,406!







Table A2. Sensitivity analysis for stage 2 gravity regressions.  Total merchandise trade. 
! A! B! C! D! E! F!
ln(1+tariff)! 34.743! 34.659! 34.608! 34.629! 34.672! -4.799!
! (32.87)***! (32.87)***! (32.84)***! (32.84)***! (32.87)***! (-2.99)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
ln(distance)! 30.780! 30.776! 30.783! 30.777! 30.780! -0.762!
! (320.36)***! (320.37)***! (320.40)***! (320.25)***! (320.72)***! (-21.98)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
common! 0.320! 0.310! 0.299! 0.312! 0.307! 0.313!
!!colony! (2.13)**! (2.05)**! (1.97)**! (2.06)**! (2.01)**! (2.04)**!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
common! 0.467! 0.464! 0.465! 0.463! 0.478! 0.465!
!!!language! (5.67)***! (5.65)***! (5.71)***! (5.60)***! (5.81)***! (5.64)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
common! 0.497! 0.488! 0.464! 0.486! 0.473! 0.484!
!!!border! (5.10)***! (4.93)***! (4.83)***! (4.97)***! (4.88)***! (4.93)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
former! 0.626! 0.628! 0.614! 0.630! 0.620! 0.625!
!!!colony! (5.48)***! (5.48)***! (5.32)***! (5.51)***! (5.39)***! (5.36)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
European!! 0.575! 0.545! 0.451! 0.560! 0.532! 0.527!
!!Union! (4.54)***! (4.30)***! (3.49)***! (4.36)***! (4.11)***! (4.62)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
FTA!depth! 0.087! 0.086! 0.076! 0.088! 0.079! 0.093!
!!!! (3.74)***! (3.70)***! (3.18)***! (3.82)***! (3.34)***! (5.79)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
polity!index! 0.370! ! ! ! ! !
! (2.48)**! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! !
functioning!of! ! 0.130! ! ! ! !
!!!government!!!
!!!index!
! (0.93)! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! !
corruption!! ! ! 30.295! ! ! !
!!!index! ! ! (32.29)**! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! !
civil!society!! ! ! ! 0.202! ! !
!!index! ! ! ! (1.19)! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! !
PCA1! ! ! ! ! 0.012! 0.008!
! ! ! ! ! (0.67)! (0.47)!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
PCA2! ! ! ! ! 30.080! -0.073!
! ! ! ! ! (32.84)***! (-2.61)***!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
PCA3! ! ! ! ! 30.028! -0.029!
! ! ! ! ! (30.31)! (-0.32)!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
N! 10,721! 10,720! 10,721! 10,721! 10,721! 10,721!
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